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This study demonstrates how an EU law, Dublin 111, affects a 
heterogeneous group of refugees and migrants in Germany who first 
enter the EU through States such as Italy, Spain, or Hungary.  The 
Dublin regulation allows refugees (with the exception of refugees from 
Syria) solely to make asylum-claims in the EU country through which 
they first enter and where they are initially fingerprinted. Therefore, if 
authorities find asylum-seekers’ fingerprints in the database and can 
thus confirm that they have been in another EU Member State, then 
according to the Dublin regulation,  they can be deported to the first 
country. The study illustrates the ways in which many refugees and 
migrants in Germany negotiate the Dublin law in differentiated ways, 
which subsequently enables them to claim their rights to personhood 
and dignity.   More specifically, this study interrogates how some 
refugees are affected by the Dublin legislation and how they negotiate 
this law.  This group of refugees have varied status in Germany – 
some have claimed asylum, some fear imminent deportations, others 
have not claimed asylum within Germany, while there are others who 
are in the process of ‘getting out of Dublin’.  The study explores how 
these refugees with differing positions, status, and background 
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This study demonstrates the ways in which refugees and migrants negotiate the 
Dublin legislation in Germany. Deportations to EU member states have been based 
on an agreement between the countries of the European Union (Dublin 111). 
According to the agreement, asylum-seekers are to be returned to the country of 
arrival in Europe and thus they have only one chance to claim asylum. Therefore, if 
authorities find an asylum-seeker’s fingerprints in the database and can confirm that 
they have been in another EU member state, then according to the Dublin regulation, 
the asylum-seeker can be deported to the first country. This law works in conjunction 
with the EURODAC regulation, which provides for a fingerprint database to identify 
asylum-seekers. 
As a consequence of the Dublin law, the status of the groups of refugees and 
migrants tends to vary. Some of the refugees and migrants have limited rights if they 
elect not to apply for asylum in Germany. While others include asylum-seekers who 
are waiting for decisions from immigration authorities and thus have access to basic 
rights such as food and accommodation, but at the same time fear deportation upon 
discovery of their fingerprints in the first EU member state. The study explores how 
this heterogeneous group of refugees and migrants with differing statuses who arrive 
from differing EU countries negotiate their position in Germany. This study also 
allows for a rethinking of migrant struggles – as struggles inclusive of and for 
personhood rather than simply as collective political actions. The study demonstrates 
that refugee and migrant activism needs to be recognized as a heterogeneous process. 
Refugees’ resistance needs to be understood beyond politics since their acts, tactics 
and strategies and their struggles may additionally focus on attainment of sense of self, 
dignity and personhood. 
Various thinkers relate the concept of personhood to notions of personal 
autonomy, self-hood, reflexivity and personal identity (Higgs and Gilleard, 2015). 
Ohlin (2005) notes that personhood and the necessary constituents, such as possessing 
consciousness determines moral status and in turn confers rights. Taylor (1992) 
connects personhood with the notion of moral agency. He argues that it is the very 
fact that people can experience guilt and shame and possess the capability of wanting 
to be other than what they are, form the very basis of personhood. Beverly Skeggs 
discusses the ways in which the abject inhabit personhood. Skeggs (2011) argues that 
personhood is found in the repeated attempts of the working-class to attach value 
through respectability such that their claims for value are not necessarily acquisitive 
but protests against moral denigration and misrecognition.  
Legal scholar, Linda Bosniak’s discussion on personhood is particularly useful 
for understanding non-citizens’ acts for personhood, since she argues it is the law, 
which denies undocumented immigrants their sense of dignity. Bosniak argues that 
undocumented immigrants experience diminished personhood because of stringent 
laws and border controls and suggests that people need to strive for personhood 
because it is not automatically granted. She bases her argument on the fact that 
historically, large classes of human beings were denied recognition as equal – legal and 
moral persons –, treated as property, objects or otherwise less-than-persons. Bosniak, 
alluding specifically to undocumented immigrants, highlights three constitutional 
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constructs that threaten significant evasions of personhood, which includes 
territoriality, peoplehood and enemy status. Bosniak argues, ‘recognition of their 
status of personhood means that they are within the pale, within the law, for purpose 
of basic functioning in contemporary liberal society’ (2011: 208). However, 
constitutional personhood is evaded and constrained for immigrants through the 
government’s immigration enforcement authority of ‘the border’ and the ‘ever present 
threat of deportation’ (Bosniak, 2011). In this regard, I argue that refugees and 
migrants in Germany with limited and shifting statuses contest for recognition of 
personhood when the European Commission diminish their personhood through 
imposition of restrictive laws. Even more significantly, several of the refugees’ 
struggles, which form part of this study, need to be understood to extend beyond 
collective contestations for territorial rights since they struggle in individual ways to be 
counted as a person.  
The study addresses the following questions: How do the refugees and migrants 
entering from southern EU countries manage to continue to survive in Germany? 
Under which circumstances do they manage to stay? Does the Dublin law affect 
differing groups of migrants and refugees in different ways?  
 
Migrants and Mobilisation 
 
Mobilisation among refugees and migrants has been the focus of much scholarship. 
With prevailing policies resulting in the exclusion of legal migration, recent 
scholarship has attended to the ways in which refugees and migrants engage in every 
day acts of resistance. Immigrants often negotiate their everyday lives in their host 
states in the absence of formal citizenship. Nevertheless migrants and refugees without 
formal status are not left entirely without resources and in many cases seek out 
lawyers, agents, teachers, priests, journalists, activists and shopkeepers to help facilitate 
their migration process and to further help reverse their irregular status (Castle et al., 
2012). In this regard, several scholars have demonstrated the ways in which regular 
and irregular refugees and migrants transform the idea of formal citizenship through 
their resistance (e.g. Isin, 2009; Anderson, 2010; Chimienti, 2011). Scholarship on 
refugees’ mobilisation has understood their agency and activism as substantive 
citizenship such that migrants and refugees may continue to participate in polity, 
unions and religious networks even though they may not hold formal citizenship (e.g. 
Bhimji, 2010; Bhimji, 2014; Bhimji, 2016; Galvez, 2010; Moulin and Nyers, 2007; 
Rygiel, 2011; Isin, 2009; Lowry and Nyers, 2006). Migrants’ struggles are generally 
understood in scholarship as collective claims for citizenship rights and inclusion 
rather than quests for individual dignity and respect. These struggles need not be 
regarded as mutually exclusive, but as this essay demonstrates that migrants’ struggles 
against disrespect and dehumanisation needs further understanding as contestations 
against laws that deprive them of their basic rights.  
Migrants have additionally been understood to engage in everyday acts of 
resistance or to ‘subvert the rules of obedience of which Foucault speaks as they cross 
borders and prioritize their own basic needs and requirements’ (De Genova, 2013). 
De Genova recognises migrants’ struggles for a government of human mobility at large 
as well as state formation, sovereignty, citizenship, nationalism and racial formation. 
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Scholars have also understood irregular and regular migrants as agents of 
political change and have understood their actions as ‘ruptures’ in the system (e.g. 
Balibar, 2004; Gordon, 2007; Isin, 2009; Nyers, 2008; McNevin, 2009). For example, 
Isin and Nielson introduce the notion of ‘acts of citizenship’ – a concept, which ‘aims 
to disrupt habitus, create new possibilities, claim rights and impose obligations in 
emotionally charged tones’ (p. 10). Drawing on this perspective of acts, Nyers argues 
that when non-citizens resist, they can be understood to be claim-making and rights-
taking political beings. 
Thus, much of this scholarship has understood immigrants’ struggles and 
protests as quests for systemic changes, ruptures and participation in the polity. In this 
regard, migrants’ activism is consequently understood in political collective terms, 
without much attention to the specificities of their individual struggles. In some cases, 
scholars have discussed migrants as idealized political subjects. However refugees’ and 
migrants’ everyday lives are lived out in complex ways and their acts of resistance need 
to be understood beyond the lens of citizenship (Chiementi and Solomos, 2011). 
There has been less discussion of refugees’ and migrants’ individual and differentiated 
struggles for dignity, respect, and humanity. Ellerman (2010) notes that even though 
resistance strategies are often part of a shared body of knowledge, resistance is usually 
exercised by individuals, rather than collectively which at the same moment is 
exercised towards short-term, rather than systemic change. In this regard, the notion 
of personhood with its constituents such as reflexivity, morality and respectability, 
provides a lens to understand heterogeneous and individual struggles, which do not 
necessarily always seek to challenge systemic structures or broader concerns of 
citizenship and state power but rather remain focused on the self.  
 Refugee activism has additionally been understood in categorical ways – those 
migrants who have legal status vs. those who are irregular (e.g. Galvez, 2010; 
Anderson, 2014). Migrants and refugees affected by the Dublin regulation cannot be 
easily categorised in this manner. Some of them may have refugee status in the first 
country with permission to visit the second country on a short-term basis, but they 
may not have rights to work. Others with fingerprints in a member state are based in 
the second country with decisions pending on their asylum cases. Yet other 
individuals with deportation notifications may be in the process of abiding six months 
so that they can ‘get out of Dublin’. Thus, because of the complexities of refugees’ and 





This essay is based on participant observation and interviews. I conducted 19 
interviews in English and Urdu and held informal conversations with several people in 
languages such as French, Spanish, Urdu and English. Although I interviewed a 
smaller number of people formally, I did meet, speak and spend much time in Berlin 
and the surrounding areas with many more refugees from differing countries in less 
formal situations. The refugees had travelled into Germany through various routes 
such as Italy, Greece, Malta and Hungary. The refugees and migrants were a 
heterogeneous group in terms of their formal status, countries of origin, education 
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level, and ages. Their countries of origin included Nigeria, Ghana, Pakistan and Syria. 
I conducted these interviews over a period of five months. The interview questions 
were open-ended and I focused on the ways in which the refugees were affected by the 
Dublin regulation and their everyday modes of survival since the aim of the study was 
to examine the specificities of their struggles and activism. Several of the interviewees 
mentioned that they were striving for dignity and respect and I asked them to provide 
examples and explain their understandings of these concepts. 
The ages of the interviewees ranged between 20 and 41 years. Some of the 
refugees and migrants had attained formal education in their home country. The 
migrants also differed in terms of their status in Germany. Some refugees had claimed 
asylum, others had chosen deliberately not to claim asylum, while others had claimed 
asylum and had their cases rejected and were facing deportation. Among the people I 
spoke with, nine refugees had not applied for asylum in Germany, eight refugees were 
in the asylum process and two refugees’ asylum claims had been rejected.  
I had spent much time in Berlin as a researcher and as an activist over a period 
of two years prior to conducting research on this specific project. Therefore, I had the 
opportunity to repeatedly meet several of the migrants and had established 
friendships, which I maintained through social media. There were other refugees 
whom I met for the first time with the specific purpose to conduct interviews. I met 
the people I interviewed in demonstrations, meetings, theatre performances, and at 
their respective Heims (refugee shelters). Thus the data are based on participant 
observation and interviews. I employed a snowball technique such that the refugees 
and asylum-seekers introduced me to people who had their fingerprints taken in 
bordering European countries. Participant observation formed a significant aspect of 
my methodology. I volunteered twice a week for five weeks with a group, which 
helped find temporary residence for homeless refugees. Volunteers and political 
activists from this group met refugees on a daily basis in the evenings for two hours at 
a public square, ‘Oranienplatz’ in Berlin, and arranged temporary accommodation in 
activists’ and residents’ private homes as well as in emergency shelters. In this context, 
I met several people who were affected by the Dublin regulation and held interviews 
and informal conversations with them. I attended public meetings, demonstrations, 
and discussion sessions followed by theatre and screening events. In these spaces, 
several individuals offered personal accounts of how the Dublin regulation had had an 
impact on them. I had further discussions with human rights lawyers as well as 
German activists in order to gain further clarification about the Dublin law. Finally, I 
consulted various reports and websites, which explained the law in accessible 
terminology. De Genova (2002) contends the need for scholarship related to 
undocumented immigrants and refugees to deploy ethnographic methods or other 
qualitative research techniques ‘to elicit the perspectives and experiences of 
undocumented refugees themselves, or to evoke the kinds of densely descriptive and 
textured interpretive representations of everyday life that sociocultural anthropologists 
tend to relish’. Hence, by employing a qualitative and ethnographic methodology, this 
study aims to contribute to scholarship relating to refugees and migrants whose legal 
statuses are not clearly defined.  
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Differentiated Status in Germany 
 
Refugees and migrants who arrived in Germany from the Southern European states 
had varied statuses, which shifted over a period of time. Consequently, their 
experiences within the EU states tended to differ over time. For example, the refugees 
and migrants who possessed ‘Italian documents’ decided to apply for asylum or 
simply tried to survive in Germany without asylum status. These refugees already had 
documents in one EU country and they understood that they would not be eligible to 
claim asylum in Germany. However, many of these refugees and migrants found 
themselves on the streets or in shelters. These refugees and migrants were allowed to 
travel within the Schengen states, but were not allowed to work outside the first EU 
member state that they had entered. Thus, once in Germany, the refugees and 
migrants experienced a shift in their legal status and lost their rights to work. For 
example, Fifi who came to Germany with ‘Italian papers’ decided not to apply for 
asylum in Germany. He told me, ‘if I apply for asylum then most likely at the end of 
asylum they will tell me to return to Italy’. Alice Bloch et al. (2011) argue, ‘people 
move in and out of different status – some enter in an irregular way, regularise their 
status through the asylum system and then become undocumented when their asylum 
case is refused’ (p. 1294). In this context, the refugees’ status changed not only 
because their asylum case was refused, but also because they moved from one EU 
member state to another.  
There were multiple reasons why people decided not to reside in the first EU 
country they entered and decided to come to Germany. Several of the refugees stated 
that they were unable to survive the economic situation and live a life of dignity in 
countries such as Italy or Spain or Hungary since they were unable to find 
employment. They stated that they were not provided with accommodation facilities 
and were consequently left to survive on the streets. Nevertheless, they struggled to 
survive in the country where their status was compromised. 
While some refugees decided not to claim asylum in Germany and get what 
they described as ‘small small jobs’, find shelter through some networks, and pay 
minimum rent in shared housing, there were others who decided to apply for asylum. 
However, in such circumstances, the German courts would eventually detect their 
fingerprints and they would receive a letter of rejection. In the letter, the court asked 
the applicant to provide reasons for making claims in a second European state given 
that they already had an asylum claim in a member state. For example, Asad had 
spent only a day in Italy, but was fingerprinted and thus became ineligible for asylum 
in a second country. Nevertheless, he claimed asylum in Germany, which was 
unsuccessful. Refugees and migrants who had arrived in Germany from EU states 
strove to negotiate their positions in different ways. Upon arriving in Germany, they 
were forced to make several life altering decisions. They needed to decide whether to 
claim asylum and risk deportation, but to have the opportunity to eventually regularise 
their status or to simply find work and shelter and remain in Germany with limited 
rights and irregular status. Upon rejection of their asylum cases, they needed to decide 
whether they should resist deportation or simply to agree to return to the first country. 
Thus, it becomes useful to examine migrants’ activism through the lens of 
personhood as explained by several thinkers as the concept relates to autonomy, 
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reflexivity, moral agency and self-hood. The Dublin regulation affected refugees’ and 
migrants’ decision-making processes and subsequent actions in differing ways. Thus, 
because the law became instrumental in affecting their lives in differing ways, the 
refugees were compelled to resist and negotiate the law in differing and individual 
ways.  
 
Migrants and Refugees without Asylum Claims 
 
The group of refugees and migrants who did not claim asylum needed to 
independently seek food, shelter and work, but these basic necessities were not always 
their end-goals since they spoke of attainment of dignity and humanity. The following 
sections demonstrate these different processes of struggles for basic rights and 
personhood. 
 
Seeking Housing, Health and Dignity 
 
Several of the refugees and migrants without asylum encountered housing problems. 
They arrived in smaller towns, but decided to move to Berlin to further their survival 
chances. Several refugees were forced to seek help from charity groups such as 
Caritas, but those who sought assistance from such groups did not understand this to 
be a long term-solution. The refugees realised that many of the people who lived in 
charity housing suffered from substance dependencies and mental health problems 
and the refugees and migrants who found themselves in the midst of such conflicts felt 
decidedly uncomfortable.  
Sylvia of Nigerian origin who was forced to leave Libya with her two children 
for Italy recounted her situation. In Italy, she had worked as a hairdresser for several 
years. When the economy declined, she decided to come to Germany. When she 
came to Germany, she went to Caritas with her two children. However, she was only 
able to stay there for three days since she did not feel at ease there and ultimately 
became homeless. She realised that she could not possibly live on the streets because 
children were not permitted to reside on the streets. Fearing separation from her 
children, she sought help from activists. As she stated:  
 
I went to Oranienplatz. I met some powerful women who were supporting 
refugees. They took me to the occupied school where I lived with my two kids. 
When I was there I participated in political actions and demonstrations until 
the day of the eviction.  
  
Thus, many of the refugees who did not seek asylum tried to find support among 
German activists who helped organise temporary accommodation either in their 
private homes, shelters or spaces of activism. When they were unable to find spaces 
with residents in Berlin, the activists often sent them to emergency homeless shelters. 
However, the conditions in these shelters were very difficult. They were only allowed 
to stay overnight and were forced to leave early in the morning. Subsequently, they 
had to put in a fresh request for accommodation on the following day, travel back to 
the shelter, and pay an extra day of public transport fares. The refugees encountered 
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much racism from the authorities managing these shelters. The managers conveyed an 
unfriendly demeanour and often directed the people to apply for asylum – thus 
treating them with little dignity and respect. Many of the refugees found it difficult to 
reside in these shelters but did so because they had no options. As many of them 
stated, ‘well we have to sleep somewhere…we cannot sleep on the streets’. The 
refugees and migrants spoke favourably of their experience in private accommodation 
since they believed that they were respected in such situations. However, such 
accommodation did not always help to provide a long-term solution. Many of them 
strove towards and succeeded in finding a shared housing situation over a longer 
period of time since sharing housing in this way seemingly restored their sense of 
dignity and personhood. As Skeggs demonstrates in her study that working class 
women ‘spent enormous time attempting to attach value to themselves to defend 
against devaluation, through the performance of respectability’ (p. 8). When refugees 
resisted living in inappropriate conditions and sought to find appropriate and 
respectable living spaces, they arguably resisted denigration, through their negotiations 
and strategies. 
Several of the refugees stated that sharing living space with hosts in this manner 
allowed them to integrate into the wider society since the people whom they lived with 
provided them with a sense of inclusion. Yasir, who had resided and lived in 
Manchester, U.K. for six months and worked as a security guard, stated that he felt 
particularly comfortable in Berlin because ‘people here include refugees in their daily 
lives and social activities’. He said that during his stay in Manchester,  
 
‘I realised that the city was very segregated and that the English people did not 
even enter into conversation with me let alone invite me into their houses to 
live with them. But even though it was easier to find work in England for me, I 
felt more comfortable in Berlin since it was a relatively more open city where I 
lived with German activists and also participated in local refugee struggles. I also 
believed I had a better chance of eventually gaining formal citizenship status in 
Germany and thereby I stood a better chance of acquiring social status within a 
wider society. 
 
As Bosniak puts it, people need to strive for personhood because it is not 
automatically granted. The above accounts demonstrate that several of the refugees 
sought to acquire respect since the Dublin regulation denied their chances of living in 
better circumstances. Yasir derived his sense of self through participating in refugee 
struggles together with German activists and feeling part of society. The actual State 
ceases to be significant for him and it is his interactions with members of the larger 
society which he finds more valuable. Thus, refugees value and prioritise their 
struggles in individual ways – but they demonstrate evidence of autonomy, self-
reflexivity and quests for dignity. 
Several studies have defined migrant activism through forms of struggles, which 
focus on regularising their status within the State (Nyers, 2008). However, such 
struggles for personhood cannot be solely understood as struggles between the state 
and the migrants nor can these acts be understood to disrupt the habitus, because to 
seek appropriate housing and to make connections with the wider society is to 
 INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 2 (4): 51-68.    
BHIMJI, F.: CONTESTING THE DUBLIN REGULATION: REFUGEES’ AND MIGRANTS’ CLAIMS TO 
PERSONHOOD AND RIGHTS IN GERMANY 
59 
normalise one’s life. Furthermore, actions of refugees and migrants under the Dublin 
law, need to be also regarded as individual contestations for personhood since it is this 
law, which makes it difficult for them to live a life of dignity. For example, Sylvia, who 
was initially staying at a refugee-occupied school, and who had not claimed asylum in 
Germany displayed much resistance. When the City Councillor of Kreuzberg did not 
provided her with an Ausweis (identification card), which would have allowed her to 
relocate to an assigned hostel or refugee Heim she contested this decision: 
 
After much negotiation with the City Councillor, I approached his assistant 
security man and said, ‘sir if Panhoff doesn’t help me move from the school, 
then I will move into his house with my bag and my children. So then he will 
have to explain to his wife, how he knows a woman with two children?’ In the 
end I had the card and was able to move to the Heim like the others.  
 
Thus Sylvia struggled to live in dignity. She was homeless at one stage but she then 
managed to find shelter at an occupied school – which she found difficult to stay in 
because of constant police raids. Subsequently, she was able to move into refugee 
accommodation and became eligible to stay independently with her children. 
However, in the absence of Dublin law restrictions, she would have qualified to apply 
for housing in Germany upon arrival.  
What is of significance here is that not all refugees and migrants resisted in a 
uniform manner but they all struggled for a life with dignity. They refused to stay in 
situations, which caused them distress and where their personhood remained 
threatened. For example, Sylvia participated in collective protests for a certain 
duration, but later she contested the Dublin legislation at an individual level, such that 
it enabled her to move forward with her particular case and she eventually obtained 
the rights to an individual apartment with her children. Similarly, for Yasir, 
maintaining his sense of self, gained priority over material concerns since he refused 
to continue to stay in Manchester even though he had a steady source of income 
there. For refugees, the notion of seeking shared housing in Berlin with activists needs 
to be understood as acts of preservation of dignity since they refused to stay without 
support on the streets of southern European states, which were affected in dire ways 
by the economic crisis. Rygiel (2011) recognises the ability of migrants to enact 
themselves as citizens by making claims to have presence within a social space, 
whether in the city proper, or in other global spaces, including that of the camp. 
However, arguably, for the refugees who formed part of this study, the state and 
citizenship had less significance in their everyday lives. 
In addition to housing concerns, refugees and migrants did not have access to 
medical care unless it was an acute emergency. When they suffered ailments, they 
could only go to the Apotheke (pharmacy), describe their conditions to the 
pharmacist and hope to get the adequate medicine. In this regard, the refugees strove 
to access medicine on individual basis.  
 The refugees understood this situation as discriminatory since the ‘citizens’ 
with documents were eligible for health care. Although there was not an EU member 
state that specifically prohibited health care access, publicly subsidised care was not 
guaranteed across the region and undocumented immigrants were more likely to use 
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NGO clinics or emergency systems and were generally unable to pay medical fees 
(LeVoy and Geddie, 2010). In such situations, refugees and migrants who arrived 
from a first country – many of them with refugee status in the first EU member state –
did not possess an EU health insurance card and thus depended on pharmacists or 
NGO clinics to provide them with the correct treatment.  
Much scholarship has discussed how undocumented immigrants demonstrate 
the dire conditions they encounter when they lack formal status as their protection 
under international law is limited in a given state (e.g. LeVoy and Geddie, 2010; Bloch 
et al., 2011). Thus, the refugees and migrants had legal status in one EU member 
state, but needed to struggle for basic rights such as healthcare and housing, which 
they equated with a dignified way of life, in another EU state. As Omar stated, which 
echoed the voice of many refugees and immigrants, ‘we can only compare ourselves to 
Italians and Spanish who could elect to leave their own countries in favour of a better 
economic situation within the EU’. As Bosniak argues that undocumented immigrants 
experience diminished personhood because of stringent laws and border controls. 
The denial of health care to immigrants and refugees arriving from EU member States 
supports Bosniak’s constitutional construct that immigrants and refugees are treated 
‘less than persons within the pale’. Nevertheless, despite the regulation, many 
individuals sought to access the healthcare system in differing ways. 
 
Work and Personhood 
 
Refugees and migrants who came through EU member states struggled to find work 
since they were not permitted to work in an EU member state of their choice. The 
group of refugees and migrants who had not sought asylum struggled to sustain 
themselves. They were pushed into what they called ‘black’, ‘light’ or ‘small small 
jobs’. The refugees and migrants often equated work with dignity. For example, Fifi 
expressed his thoughts to me in the following way: 
 
I wake up in the middle of the night and ask why can’t I find work? Why am I 
not allowed to work here? I don’t do marijuana. I don’t do crimes. Because of 
paper I cannot work. Because of paper I cannot get my life together. This is not 
peace in the world. I’m here because I’m in danger. And then people look at us 
in a bad way because we don’t have much work. 
 
Akbar told me that when he arrived in Germany, he immediately found work doing 
construction work. He gave the following account: 
 
When I find work I see that people exploit me. Some pay me. Some don’t. 
Simply because my papers are not valid here. I can work in Italy, but in Italy 
there is no work. I put leaflets into people’s letterboxes and they employ me for 
30 Euros per day. After that I started construction work. I get 5 Euros per hour 
and make about 40 to 50 Euros a day. But I used to give to charity when I lived 
in Pakistan. I do not have the same standard of living in Europe. 
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Thus the above accounts demonstrate that refugees who had arrived from other EU 
member states struggled to find work. They believed that the economy in Germany 
was stronger than in Italy. Thus, the accounts and experiences demonstrate that the 
refugees’ and migrants’ persistent endeavours to find work needs to be understood in 
terms of individual material struggles as well as their struggles to be counted as a 
person when it was the law that threatened their dignity and respectability (Bosniak, 
2011). In this connection, it was the Dublin law, which prohibited refugees and 
migrants from attaining formal work status. The refugees who could not apply for 
asylum in the affluent European state were saddled with low-paid precarious work. 
Consequently, rather than granting value to migrants, the Dublin regulation helped 
facilitate a richer western EU member state obtain cheap and flexible labour.  
 
Asylum Applicants and the Dublin Law 
 
Despite the Dublin law, migrants and refugees had decided to apply for asylum. Their 
positions differed somewhat from that of the people who did not apply for asylum. 
They did not immediately need to find work and shelter and resided in refugee 
accommodation and received state benefits.  
 Unlike the people who had not applied for asylum, the asylum-seekers had 
access to shelter, food, and healthcare, but many people elected to work. The policies 
with respect to right to work for asylum-seekers were rather complex and many 
asylum-seekers could not work or find Ausbildung (apprenticeships). Thus, Bosniak’s 
argument that it is the State which constrains personhood through its’ enforcement of 
particular laws becomes valid. For example, Aslam explained,  
 
you very well know the situation of Pakistan, there is no electricity, there is the 
constant danger of bomb blasts, one doesn’t even know when a person steps 
out of the house that he or she would be able to return home or die on the 
streets. And so I really need to work, live a dignified life and send money 
home. That is all I wish.  
  
Munir, an asylum-seeker, who had his fingerprints recorded in the Italian embassy in 
Mozambique when he applied for a Schengen visa and who came to Germany after 
spending some time in Italy stated that he tried to put meaning in his life by selling 
flowers at the weekends in Berlin. He gave the following account: 
 
I know that I am not allowed to work here. But it’s like my own business. I am 
selling flowers. It’s enjoyable work. My headache declines. And I am not 
hurting anyone else in the process. I meet people in this way. I get to chat to 
people. I feel chilled out then. The atmosphere changes. If I don’t work then I 
think that I would go crazy in this way. Sometimes I go to Club SO36 in 
Kreuzberg to sell flowers. It’s a very welcoming club and they play all kinds of 
music there. I really enjoy the atmosphere there. So I just want to work in the 
way that normal people work. I want to pay taxes to the German State. 
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These accounts demonstrate that asylum-seekers struggled for fuller membership in 
the wider society, but at the same time their actions could not be understood as overt 
and collective resistance to State power. The State held minimum significance for 
these refugees, who were focused on their individual needs, which in some instances 
extended beyond acquisition of material gains. For Munir, it was not sufficient that he 
had a place to reside – his aim was to integrate and gain respect in the wider society 
through work and paying taxes. In this regard, even refugees and migrants, who had 
some legal status in Germany, desired respect vis-à-vis employment since the notion of 
work was tied to dignity and personhood. Scholarship has understood refugees’ 
resistance claims for rights as political ruptures (Nyers, 2008). However, there has 
been less understanding of actions, which can be regarded as refugees’ struggles for an 
improved self. Munir’s act of selling flowers cannot be understood solely an act of 
citizenship since he did not aim to participate in a wider polity, nor did he aim to shift 
laws which denied basic working rights to individuals affected by the Dublin policy at a 
collective level.  
 
Resisting Deportation and Rights 
 
Following a period of six months, from the time of their deportation proceedings or 
the expiration of their visa, an asylum-seeker with fingerprints in another EU member 
state could not be deported from Germany and could become eligible to apply for 
permanent asylum if they managed to stay in the second country. However, in the first 
six months many refugees and migrants experience the ever present threat of 
deportation, thus ‘diminishing their sense of personhood’ (Bosniak, 2011).  
Many asylum-seekers contested the Dublin regulation individually by resisting 
deportation. In several instances, refugees were taken to an airport and put on a plane. 
In such situations, they often refused to board the plane because they knew that 
ultimately the pilot made the final decision about refugees’ flight out of the country. 
As Michael from Cameroon, told me that at the airport he simply refused to board 
the plane. He gave the following account: 
 
I told them, ‘I am not here to leave Germany but I am here to find a solution’. 
The flight was ready, but I said I don’t want to go up. I simply refused and they 
couldn’t use force. I then explained to them about the difficult situation in 
Cameroon. So, I came back to the Heim. But no one has come back for me 
yet. Then the police told me that I needed to come back again. Many people 
then advised me to leave the Heim, but I continued to stay there letting 
everyone know that I would not run. I said, ‘I am not a thief so why should I 
hide or run? I will just wait here till Dublin is finished for me. If I can stay here 
for six months then I don’t have to go back’.  
 
Michael’s refusal to get on board can be understood as an act of resistance against 
injustice. Walters (2015) understands resistance located within commercial vehicles as 
‘viapolitics’, arguing that acts of struggle within vehicles and their routes will continue 
as long as regimes of migration control continue. Thus, Michael’s anti-deportation 
resistance could be understood in political terms – against the conditions of the 
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Dublin regulation and against regimes and migration policies. However, Michael did 
not participate in any collective action. He continued to strive for his dignity by 
continuing to stay at the Heim since he refused to be criminalised for his particular 
actions.  
While some asylum-seekers resisted deportation at airports, there were others 
who simply tried to find networks, which helped them survive the six-month period. 
There were many who decided to resist deportation by leaving their Heim following a 
deportation notification. Ali who had arrived from Malta resisted his deportation by 
taking a train from Gissen to Berlin. Since he had participated in some of the refugee 
mobilisation in Berlin for a year, he had established networks in Berlin. When he 
received his letter notifying him about his deportation proceedings, he contacted these 
networks and found a room in privately shared accommodation. He explained, ‘I stay 
in a small room which I share with three women. I come to Kotti Café every evening, 
talk to people and drink ginger and mint tea, which helps me. I don’t smoke much 
anymore’. Similarly, Osman upon receiving a letter rejecting his asylum case 
immediately left his Heim, met German activists and requested accommodation in a 
private house. He received some assistance in this regard for a week and ultimately 
decided to return to Italy to renew his documents. There were several refugees with 
documents from Italy who followed a similar procedure, ensuring that their Italian 
documents would remain valid while they tried to carve out a living in Germany. In 
this regard, many would travel back and forth between Italy and Germany three to 
four times a year. Taylor explains personhood in terms of moral agency and contends 
that people select from a range of options to live their lives because they experience 
affective responses. Refugees and migrants who protest against deportations as 
described in the above accounts enacted moral agency since they refused to 
experience the moral consequences of deportation and elected to survive in extremely 
difficult circumstances. For example, Ali of Pakistani origin resisted deportation to 
Austria by deciding to come to Berlin, finding some networks, and participating in 
various political actions and demonstrations with refugee activists. Ali’s fingerprints 
were recorded in Austria. However, he decided to apply for asylum in Germany. 
Unhappy with his living conditions in his refugee accommodation and fearing 
deportation following the rejection of his asylum application, he ultimately found 
residence in a former squat house in Berlin and lived in a community with German 
citizens. He stated his plan was to stay there for six months and then to reapply for 
asylum. In the meantime, he also worked ‘black jobs’ and managed to survive 
economically.  
Zainab a woman who arrived with her family from Syria through Hungary at the 
time when the Dublin regulation applied to Syrians became ineligible to apply for a 
second time in Germany. However, she managed to receive church asylum for six 
months, which was also very difficult to obtain since there were very few churches, 
which actually did offer church asylum in Germany. Zainab explained that she had 
stayed under church protection under very difficult conditions. She was not allowed to 
leave the premises as and when she wished, was not allowed visitors, and thus suffered 
much isolation during this process. She was informed that the consequence of leaving 
the church grounds would result in police arrests followed by deportation to Hungary. 
She pointed out that she had little choice since the option was to either to be deported 
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to Hungary and to face detention for illegally leaving and entering the country or to 
remain within the grounds of the church and ultimately ‘get out of Dublin’. Zainab 
chose the latter option and selected church sanctuary. 
These accounts demonstrate that many asylum-seekers whose cases were 
rejected found differing ways to tide over the six-month period to ‘get out of Dublin’. 
Their accounts show that they resisted against deportations from Germany in 
fragmented ways. Although many of the asylum-seekers tended to ‘act’ upon receipt of 
the letters informing them about their deportation proceeding or questioning them 
about the validity application, they had managed to form social networks through 
collective activism prior to the receipt of these letters. It is these social networks that 
helped them with struggles for their rights. Thus, refugees’ collective agency and 
actions must not be entirely disregarded, but at the same time individual and 
differentiated resistance for their rights and personhood need recognition. Their acts 
demonstrate that they all struggled for personhood since they refused to be deported 
and in the process resisted being criminalised, isolated, or being left without resources 
and means.  
 
Collective Actions and Personhood 
 
In addition to individual ways of resistance refugees participated in collective actions. 
These acts could be understood to be relatively overtly political and the people who 
participated in demonstrations were concerned about changes in laws, which put them 
in difficult positions. However, at the same time these refugees had concerns about 
being counted as a person and for equal respect. For example, after receiving the 
rejection letter from the German courts, Ismael joined a protest bus tour and the 
protest tent group in Berlin with the aim to contest the asylum-policy in Germany. 
However, within 18 months, the tents were dismantled and many of the refugees who 
were affected by the Dublin law were then allowed to stay temporarily in a hostel, but 
then they received eviction letters within six months of their relocation. Included in 
this group were some migrants and refugees who had arrived in Berlin directly from 
another EU member state. Although there were several political actions against the 
evictions, they did not succeed. Finally, several refugees occupied a church and 
ultimately received church protection. They received church sanctuary after members 
of the church and the refugees entered into a prolonged and deliberate discussion 
concerning the topic of accommodation. For more than six months this church group 
has been providing refugees with accommodation in the church’s meeting offices as 
well as in various community housing projects. However, it was not an easy task. The 
120 refugees were forced to relocate constantly between offices in churches and 
community housing. The refugees additionally received 5 Euros per day. Ismael like 
many other refugees ultimately became involved in a series of political actions. Even 
after receiving church accommodation, some of the refugees organised a ‘We are still 
here…’ demonstration in May 2015, and an arch symbolising the boat on the 
Mediterranean Sea was carried on the demonstration route. Ismael commented that 
he was happy to see many black people participate in the demonstration, ‘because this 
demonstration is about refugees and if a demonstration is dominated by Europeans, 
then people ask where are the refugees’. 
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What is significant here is that even at a collective level, the refugees were very 
focused on individual concerns such as housing and their presence, The refugees 
resisted sleeping on the streets or to be deported to the first country where they would 
potentially encounter ill conditions. In this regard, their collective actions must also be 
understood as claims to personhood and dignity. Linda Bosniak raises the following 
point: ‘The very fact that undocumented are here in itself entitles them to significant 
constitutional rights and recognition. The territoriality principle accords legal and 
ethical significance to ‘hereness’, appropriately focusing on the social fact of a person’s 
presence rather than on the legal formality of status to anchor basic constitutional 
recognition’ (p. 211). Thus, the demonstration with the banners and the symbolic arch 
demonstrated refugees’ individual presence in Berlin in addition to their struggles for 
constitutional recognition. 
There were also groups of refugees from Lampedusa, who were involved in 
self-mobilisation. These groups, ‘Lampedusa in Berlin’ and ‘Lampedusa in Hamburg’ 
collectively demanded recognition of their refugee status, the right to work and 
residence in Germany. With support from activists, they organised public meetings 
and protests. However, at the same time, apart from such collective actions, individual 
refugees who formed part of this group went to several church groups, theatre 
discussions and student organisations in Universities where they raised awareness 
about the Dublin regulation. They aimed to counter the adverse messages about 
refugees and asylum-seekers in the mainstream media. Nadir pointed out that it was 
important for him to speak to people directly rather than to the media:  
We know who we are and the media do not. And people can respond directly. 
For example, this young school student aged thirteen was asking very intelligent 
questions. They told me that we are all equal and that not all people are bad. Many of 
these children are German citizens who have fathers and mothers from different 
countries such as Turkey so they also understand the situation. 
Thus refugees and asylum-seekers self-mobilised in differentiated ways, because 
they participated in public spaces, public gatherings and theatre. Actions undertaken 
by refugees and migrants affected by Dublin regulation remained fragmented because 
the law affected them in varying ways and their strategies led to different results. In this 
regard, they were compelled to act in differing ways. Some refugees and migrants were 
more dependent on their social networks while others acted more independently, but 
nevertheless the accounts demonstrated that many strove for a sense of self and 




Drawing on the concept of personhood as expressed by several scholars and 
Bosniak’s idea that there is no guarantee of personhood for undocumented 
immigrants in the pale this study has shown that for many refugees and migrants 
affected by the Dublin law, personhood remained at stake. Scholars of refugee and 
migrant activism contend that migrants collectively contest wide-ranging issues such 
State power, borders, and citizenship status (e.g. De Genova, 2013; Nyers, 2008; 
Chimienti and Solomos, 2011; Galvez, 2010). Several scholars have argued that it is 
through their collective activism and contestations of their spaces that non-citizens 
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enact citizenship (Rygeil, 2011). The refugees who had entered through European 
Union member states such as Italy, Hungary and Spain and had decided to relocate to 
their preferred EU State such as Germany, decided to stay and respond to the 
restrictions imposed by the Dublin law in individual and varied ways. Several refugees 
participated in political actions, theatre groups, community events and discussion 
sessions with the hope of bringing change in the asylum laws and policies thus 
depicting moral agency. Many refugees aimed to negotiate the law at an individual 
level and focused on attainment of personhood and dignity. In this way, refugee 
activism cannot always be understood in terms of struggles for rights to citizenship and 
contestations of border regimes and power, but rather their actions need to be 
understood inclusive of, and for personhood. In this regard, non-citizens’ migrant 
activism needs reconsideration since the laws do not only deny them access to formal 
citizenship but rather to a host of basic rights that are connected to an individual’s 
sense of self and well-being. Struggles for citizenship may need reworking since 
personhood in many instances may overshadow broader concerns of migrants’ formal 
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